therefore, cannot use the nexus test to decline jurisdiction over pleasure boat torts. Consequently, the only way for lower courts to decline jurisdiction is to apply the locus test to find that the tort did not occur on navigable waters. Such decisions misuse the jurisdictional locus test to achieve a substantive result. 19 Despite the confusion, it remains desirable for plaintiffs in some situations, and for defendants in others, to have the case heard in admiralty.20 All parties, therefore, have an interest in having the navigable waters of the United States clearly defined. A precise and stable definition also serves the courts' own interests of judicial economy and ease of administration. 21
This Note develops a simple set of principles useful for defining navigable waters in a contemporary context. Part I considers why federal admiralty jurisdiction exists, and traces the evolution of the phrase navigable waters as a term of art. Part II analyzes the conflicting contemporary definitions of navigable waters. Part III resolves the conflict by proposing guidelines that address the major concerns of all competing definitions. The system advocated is consistent with the goals of admiralty, constitutionally sound, easy to apply, and focuses attention on the nexus test to resolve the issue of whether particular cases "belong" in admiralty.
I. HISTORY, POLICY, COMMERCE, AND THE DEFINITION OF NAVIGABLE WATERS
This Part examines the historical development of, and policy reasons for, a distinct federal admiralty jurisdiction. The standard of navigability developed in this Note is designed to complement these origins and goals. Section I.A reviews the origin of federal maritime jurisdiction and suggests that history is ambiguous with regard to what interests federal admiralty courts were intended to serve. Section l.B explains that, although admiralty jurisdiction is independent of the federal interest in interstate commerce, maritime activity and inter-19. See ALI STUDY, supra note 5, at 227-28. 20. A plaintiff might prefer admiralty jurisdiction for several reasons: to obtain federal jurisdiction when there is no diversity of citizenship, e.g., Marroni v. Matey, 492 F. Supp. 340 (E.D. Pa. 1980) ; to be classified as a seaman under the Jones Act, 46 U.S. C. app. § 688 (1988) , e.g., Jones v. Duke Power Co., 501 F. Supp. 713 (W.D.N.C. 1980) ; to sue under the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. § § 741-52 (1988) , instead of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § § 2671 -80 (1988 ), e.g., Respess v. United States, 586 F. Supp. 861 (E.D. La. 1984 ; to sue under the federal maritime wrongful death cause of action, e.g., Truehart v. Blandon, 672 F. Supp. 929 (E.D. La. 1987) ; to have a cause of action under the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § § 901-50 (1988) , e.g., Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212 (1969) . A defendant might prefer admiralty: to take advantage of the Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § § 181-96 (1988) , e.g., Three Buoys Houseboats v. Morts, 921 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1990 ), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 272 (1991 ; or where the United States is a defendant, because the statute of limitations under the Suits in Admiralty Act may be shorter than that under the Federal Tort Claims Act, e.g., Cooper v. United States, 500 F. Supp. 191 (W.D. Mo. 1980) . 21. Sisson, 110 S. Ct. at 2902 (Scalia, J., concurring).
state commerce are often impossible to separate, making analysis of "pure" admiralty questions difficult. Section I.C traces the evolution of the term navigable waters and describes the various contexts in which it is employed.
A. The History and Purpose of Admiralty
Commentators agree that to make "any sense at all," 22 federal admiralty courts must serve some compelling federal interest that would be frustrated by leaving matters to adjudication in state courts. 23 Precisely identifying that compelling interest, however, is difficult. Most frequently mentioned are the need to apply a uniform body of law, 24 and the unique needs of the commercial shipping industry. 25 Some courts have combined these interests and defined uniformity as the mechanism that achieves the more substantive goal of regulating the shipping industry. 26 Whether this interpretation accurately reflects the historical origins of the admiralty courts, however, is unclear.
The Framers' intent in including "all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction" in the federal judicial power is frustratingly obscure. 27 There is no evidence of substantive debate over the matter at the Constitutional Convention, 28 and the matter was apparently so uncontroversial as to merit a mere two lines in The Federalist. 29 The First Congress included admiralty and maritime jurisdiction 328-31 (Supp. 1991-92) . 26. See, e.g .. Adams v. Montana Power Co., 528 F.2d 437, 439 (9th Cir. 1975 460, 469 (1925) . This explanation has been criticized as historically inaccurate, ROBINSON, supra, at 6-17, but the matter is now of purely academic significance. Courts do not distinguish between admiralty and maritime cases and for all practical purposes the terms are synonyms. See MOORE & PELAEZ, supra note 5, ~ .200[1] n.1, at 2011. The only possible exception is that maritime may occasionally be used to refer specifically to the sea, not freshwater. See FRIEDELL, supra, § 103, . In this Note the terms admiralty jurisdiction and maritime jurisdiction are used interchangeably.
28. Putnam, supra note 27, at 460.
29. The most bigotted idolizers of state authority have not thus far shown a disposition to deny the national judiciary the cognizance of maritime causes. These so generally depend on the laws of nations and so commonly affect the rights of foreigners, that they fall within the considerations which are relative to the public peace. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 590-91 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1864). [Vol. 90:1028 in the powers conferred on the newly established federal courts by the Judiciary Act of 1789. 30 Because the Act used virtually the same language as the Constitution, 31 determining the jurisdictional and substantive limits of admiralty is a question of constitutional interpretation to be decided by the judiciary. 3 2 Unfortunately, what the Framers intended the federal admiralty jurisdiction to include is just as uncertain as why they created it at all. 33 Consequently, in the first half of the nineteenth century the Supreme Court struggled to identify both the source of law to be applied in, and the interests served by, the federal admiralty courts. 34 In 1847 the Court finally concluded that admiralty is based on general principles of law used by all maritime nations. 35 The result is that today in admiralty cases federal courts apply a body of judge-made law consisting of "an amalgam of traditional common-law rules, modifications of those rules, and newly created rules." 36 The definition of navigable waters is just such an amalgamated rule.
During the Supreme Court's first century, when the underlying purpose of admiralty was more at issue than it is today, the Court identified three justifications for maintaining federal jurisdiction. Practically, federal jurisdiction produces a more uniform body of law than does state adjudication. 37 More fundamentally, because of its re-30. 1 Stat. 73 (1789). 31. " [A] ll civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." 1 Stat. 77, § 9 (1789). 32. We look upon [the Judiciary Act of 1789] as legislative action contemporary with the first being of the constitution, expressive of the opinion of some of its framers, that the grant of admiralty jurisdiction was to be interpreted by the courts in accordance with the acknowledged principles of general admiralty law. Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (S How.) 4S6, 470 (1847). The limit of admiralty jurisdiction "[i]s to be ascertained by a reasonable and just construction of the words used in the constitution, taken in connection with the whole instrument, and the purposes for which admiralty and maritime jurisdiction was granted to the Federal Government." The Steamer St. Lawrence, 66 U.S. (1 Black) S22, S27 (1862).
33. Wright, supra note S, at 129. 34. In 181S, Justice Story wrote an exhaustive 26-page opinion analyzing the possible sources of American maritime law. He considered the law employed by English admiralty courts at the time of the American Revolution; the law exercised by the English courts in the seventeenth century before their jurisdiction was greatly curtailed; the law employed in the colonies at the time of the revolution, which was more extensive than that in England itself; "the ancient and original jurisdiction, ipherent in the admiralty of England by virtue of its general organization." De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 418 (C.C.D. Mass. 181S) (No. 3776). Story concluded that " [t] he language of the Constitution will therefore warrant the most liberal interpretation," meaning that admiralty in this country is based on general principles used by all maritime nations. 7 F. Cas. at 418. 36. East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 8S8, 86S (1986) . 37. Federal jurisdiction avoided the "difficulties" and "evils" that resulted from the separate exercise of admiralty power by individual states before 1789. Waring, 46 U.S. at 462. In addition to uniformity for the sake of consistency, the Framers may have been concerned that individual states would unfairly discriminate in cases involving their citizens. See The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall) SSS (1874), which concerned the ability of a state to create causes of action in lation to international trade and war, admiralty jurisdiction was seen as an essential attribute of national sovereignty. 38 By 1778, all of the original states had established admiralty courts. 39 With the ratification of the Constitution, the states ceded ~dmiralty jurisdiction (an attribute of their independent sovereignty) to the federal government.40 The Supreme Court has viewed this transfer of sovereign power as complete. 41 Finally, as described in section B, admiralty jurisdiction serves a special federal interest in regulating the waterways used in interstate commerce.
In summary, because the Framers were silent on why they included admiralty jurisdiction in the Constitution, the Supreme Court had to determine what federal interests admiralty is designed to serve. Most generally, admiralty has been defined as an attribute of sovereign power. More specifically, the Court has recognized that the federal government has interests in maintaining jurisdiction over the arteries of interstate commerce, in applying a uniform body of law, and in regulating maritime trade.
B. The Relationship Between Admiralty and Commerce
In 1852, in The Propeller Genesee Chiefv. Fitzhugh, the Supreme Court declared that admiralty jurisdiction does not depend on the fedaiimiralty. "[A] more rational view of the question demands an adverse ruling in order to preserve harmony and logical consistency in the general system .... " 88 U.S. at 571.
38. Hamilton's justification of a federal admiralty power, discussed supra note 29, is clearly based on a notion of national competence. Foreigners, he implies, should be dealt with on the national level. Similarly, because admiralty cases may frequently arise outside the borders of a state and may involve other countries, state adjudication is inappropriate. CHARLES A. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 1, at 2 (3d ed. 1976). In addition, the Supreme Court has frequently spoken of maritime law as a type of national power derived from the concept of sovereignty. See, e.g., Jackson v. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 296, 300-01 (1858) . An example of a national concern best adjudicated in a federal system is the disposition of prizes. 28 U.S.C. § 1333(2) (1988 (1819) ("The government of the Union ... is emphatically, and truly, a government of the people. In form and in substance it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit.") The Supreme Court, however, has always described maritime power as coming from the states. The Court has never explained why the admiralty power does not come from the people. [Vol. 90:1028 eral interest in regulating interstate commerce. 42 The Court has use4 this doctrine repeatedly to reject arguments that there is no federal jurisdiction over accidents involving vessels engaged in purely intrastate commerce. 43 Ultimately, the Court characterized such arguments as "a complete misconception of what the admiralty jurisdiction is under the Constitution of the United States." 44 The Genesee Chief doctrine had three important consequences. First, it laid the groundwork for the strict locality rule for admiralty tort jurisdiction. 45 Second, it led to the rule that admiralty jurisdiction over contracts depends on their maritime nature, not on whether the contracts concern an interstate transaction. 46 Third, it made possible the constitutional interpretation that the Article III grant of admiralty jurisdiction enables Congress to pass maritime legislation independent of the Commerce Clause. 47 As a historical matter, this interpretation was necessary to expand federal authority beyond the constrictive limits then placed on the federal commerce power. 48 50 However, the Admiralty Clause 51 and the concern expressed in early cases that federal jurisdiction extend over waters tfo~t are "highways of commerce" 52 evidence a broader concern with the interstate waters themselves. The federal interests in interstate commerce and in the movement of people across state lines were protected by asserting jurisdiction over the "highways" on which they moved.
The federal interstate highway system provides a useful analogy. In Foremost Insurance Co. v. Richardson, 53 Justice Powell used the highway analogy to attack the assertion of admiralty jurisdiction over accidents involving pleasure boats. Powell claimed that "no one suggests that federal jurisdiction is needed to prevent chaos in automobile traffic, or that only federal courts are qualified to try accident cases." 54 Powell was correct, but his argument overlooked a crucial distinction between interstate commerce conducted on water and on land. The federal courts, through the Admiralty Clause, have constitutional jurisdiction over both the situs and the instruments of waterborne commerce. No such jurisdiction exists over land traffic per se. If the federal courts had constitutional jurisdiction over all cases involving commerce, for instance, there would be federal jurisdiction over all cases involving interstate trucking. And, as is currently the case in admiralty, there would be vigorous debate over which traffic accidents sufficiently affect commerce that they should be heard in federal court. It is easy to imagine courts identifying certain roads as highways of interstate commerce and leaving the rest to local jurisdiction.
Thus, there is a close relationship between the federal commerce power and admiralty jurisdiction. Although most affirmative regulation of waterborne commerce is done under the Commerce Clause, there is an independent federal interest in the waterways on which the commerce moves. The definition of navigable waters delimits the scope of that distinct federal power. 6 The Court announced that precedents defining navigable waters should be read in light of " 'the purpose for which the concept of "navigability" was invoked in a particular case.' "S 7 In so doing, the Court implied that different definitions should apply in different circumstances.
Prior to Kaiser Aetna, only a handful of lower courts distinguished different definitions of navigability.ss Furthermore, the Supreme Court itself frequently applied definitions developed in one context to unrelated cases. Nevertheless, assuming that such a classification is both important and possible, the definitions used to characterize admiralty jurisdiction, the scope of congressional regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause, and state ownership of river and lake bottoms are described below.s9
The Admiralty Definition
In 1825, following the English example, the Court restricted admiralty jurisdiction to waters within the "ebb and flow of the tide." 60 In 1852, this rule was discarded and admiralty jurisdiction was extended to all "public water used for commercial purposes or foreign trade. " 61 55. 444 U.S. 164 (1979 
The Daniel Ball and
The Montello, discussed infra at notes 69-74 and accompanying text, are the two most important and often cited cases defining navigable waters. There is considerable disagreement, however, as to whether they should be classified as admiralty or Commerce Clause cases. Both were actions brought by the United States against ships operating without the federal license required of all vessels on navigable waters. Proponents of the view that the definition of navigability developed in these precedents applies only to Commerce Clause cases base their argument on the fact that the underlying statutes were regulations adopted under the Commerce Clause. Laurent, supra note 59, at 25; Waite, supra note 59, at 442 n.61; see also Adams v. Montana Power Co., 528 F.2d 437, 440 (9th Cir. 1975 ). For two reasons, however, it makes more sense to regard these cases as defining navigable waters for admiralty cases as well as for Commerce Clause matters. First, they were admiralty cases. In each, the United States filed a libel in admiralty rather than bringing a law action. Second, in a series of "pure" admiralty cases, the Supreme Court cited the rules developed in A different test must . . . be applied to determine the navigability of our rivers, and that is found in their navigable capacity. Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water. And they constitute navigable waters of the United States within the meaning of the acts of Congress, in contradistinction from the navigable waters of the States, when they form in their ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway over which commerce is or may be carried on with other States or foreign countries in the customary modes in which such commerce is conducted by water. 67
Using this test, the Court easily found the Grand River navigable because the evidence showed it was capable of supporting steamboat traftic. 68 The Montello, 69 which concerned the navigability of the Fox River in Wisconsin, presented a more difficult case. The case originally reached the Court in 1870 but, bec~mse of insufficient evidence regarding the river itself, was remanded with instructions for the district court to apply The Daniel Ball test. 10 The Court's decision when the case returned three years later 71 is important for two reasons.
First, the Court made clear that a finding of navigability did not depend on the ease or method of navigation:
It would be a narrow rule to hold that in this country, unless a river was capable of being navigated by steam or sail vessels, it could not be treated as a public highway. The capability of use by the public for purposes of transportation and commerce affords the true criterion of the navigability of a river, rather than the extent and manner of that use. If it be capable in its natural state of being used for purposes of commerce, no matter in what mode the commerce may be conducted, it is navigable in fact, and becomes in law a public river or highway. 72
The Court did, however, add a small caveat.
It is not, however, as Chief Justice Shaw said, "every small creek in which a fishing skiff or gunning canoe can be made to float at high water which is deemed navigable, but, in order to give it the character of a navigable stream, it must be generally and commonly useful to some purpose of trade or agriculture. Second, the Court found that navigability could be established on the basis of historical records of commercial navigation~ The Court based its finding of navigability on evidence that the Fox River was traveled by explorers in 1673, was used by fur trappers in the eighteenth century, and was used as an artery of commerce by animal-drawn Durham boats in the nineteenth century. 7 4 Subsequent decisions based on The Daniel Ball and The Montello extended the admiralty jurisdiction to artificial waterways such as canals, 75 even when located entirely within a single state, as long as the waterway afforded a highway for interstate commerce. 76 The Court made clear that admiralty jurisdiction applied to vessels engaged in purely intrastate commerce on a river located entirely within one state, because rivers eventually empty into a sea, bay, or gulf. 77 The Supreme Court has not ruled directly on what constitutes navigability in the admiralty context since 1903.7 8
The Commerce Clause Definition
Federal Commerce Clause power over navigable waters originally derived from such waters' susceptibility to use in interstate commerce. 79 Gradually, however, the federal power extended beyond concern for navigation to include dams 80 and other structures, such as levees, drains, and flood control plans, that affect the waterway itself. 81 In United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 82 the Court held that federal power over waterways is not limited to regulating navigation. "In truth the authority of the United States is the regulation of "Shaw caveat" is interesting because the case cited was a property case. Rowe v. Gran,ite Bridge Corp., 38 Mass. (21 Pick.) 344 (1838). In Rowe, the plaintiffs alleged a public nuisance when the defendant constructed a road over a small creek that the plaintiffs claimed to have used for transporting hay. The Supreme Court's reliance on Rowe thus began a long history of applying definitions of navigability developed in one context to unrelated cases. Justice Rehnquist's declaration in Kaiser Aetna that definitions developed in different contexts should be kept separate, see supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text, is at odds with the very foundation of the Supreme Court's navigability doctrine.
74. 87 U.S. at 440-41. 85 The Court dropped the requirement that the waterway be navigable in its natural state. Rather, as long as a waterway could be made navigable through reasonable improvements, it would qualify as navigable. It is not even necessary that the improvements be made, or even authorized, just possible. 86 The court also endorsed the concept of "indelible navigability," 87 under which a waterway once found to be navigable in fact remains permanently navigable in law. 88 definition of navigable waters is extremely broad -broader than the admiralty definition.
State Ownership of River Bottoms
The definition of navigability used to determine state ownership of submerged lands is closely associated with the equal footing doctrine under which new states admitted to the union acquire the same property rights as the original thirteen. 91 New states acquire title to all land beneath navigable waters within their borders on the date of statehood. 92 The key question in cases of disputed ownership is whether the waters overlying the land in question were navigable on that date. 93 In these cases, the doctrine of indelible navigability applies. 94 A state could never lose title to a river bottom simply because the river is no longer used for navigation.
Although title cases have relied heavily on the definitions of navigability developed in The Daniel Ball and The Montello, 95 courts have focused on whether a waterway is capable of being used for commercial navigation; whether it actually is or has been navigated is less important. 96 In resolving questions of navigability for title, the Supreme Court has relied on four types of evidence: the physical characteristics of the waterway, such as its depth and volume of flow; 97 historical records of navigation;9 8 contemporary use by pleasure craft;99 and de- 574, 586 (1922) . 96. The question of that susceptibility in the ordinary condition of the rivers, rather than of the mere manner or extent of actual use, is the crucial question .... The extent of existing commerce is not the test. The evidence of the actual use of streams, and especially of extensive and continued use for commercial purposes, may be most persuasive, but where conditions of exploration and settlement explain the infrequency or limited nature of such use, the susceptibility to use as a highway of commerce may still be satisfactorily proved.
United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 82 (1931 The Supreme Court's long silence on the definition of navigable waters for admiralty purposes, its frequent reliance on definitions developed in Commerce Clause or property cases, and uncertainty over the interests served by federal admiralty courts have led to conflict among the courts of appeals over the proper definition of navigability. to3 The major area of disagreement concerns the amount of commerce a waterway must presently support to be considered navigable. A second issue is whether admiralty jurisdiction may ever exist over waters landlocked in a single state, and conversely, whether interstate waters may ever be excluded from admiralty.
This Part describes the two definitions of navigability currently in use. Section II.A describes the "contemporary navigability-in-fact" standard that requires evidence of ongoing or reasonably likely commercial activity. Section II.B describes the "navigational capacity" standard that requires only that commerce be possible. Section II.C considers whether waters navigable in admiralty must be part of an interstate nexus in order to fall within federal admiralty jurisdiction.
attempts to use small boats on a lake was persuasive evidence against a finding of navigability. 295 U.S. at 21-23. The Court's consideration of this evidence, however, suggests that evidence of regular use of a waterway by pleasure craft would support a finding of navigability for title purposes. 102. For instance, the Great Salt Lake was determined to be navigable on evidence of (1) "nine boats used from time to time to haul cattle and sheep from the mainland to one of the islands,'' by their owners; (2) "one boat used by an outsider who carried sheep to an island for the owners of the sheep"; (3) "a boat known as the City of Corrine which was launched in May 1871 for the purpose of carrying passengers and freight; but its life in that capacity apparently lasted less than a year. In 1872 it was converted into an excursion boat which apparently plied the waters of the lake until 1881"; (4) "other boats that hauled sheep to and from an island in the lake and also hauled ore, and salt, and cedar posts"; (5) "another boat ••. used to carry salt from various salt works around the lake to a railroad connection"; (6) The fact that the lake was 30.2 feet deep on the date Utah became a state. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. at 11-12.
103. For an excellent discussion of the difficulties faced by a district court attempting to decide whether admiralty jurisdiction is appropriate, see Wilder v. Placid Oil Co., 611 F. Supp. 841, 845-47 (W.D. La. 1985) , affd sub nom. Sanders v. Placid Oil Co., 861 F.2d 1374 (Sth Cir. 1988 ).
This Part concludes that although the first definition better reflects modem circumstances, the second is more faithful to the underlying goals of admiralty. Consequently, elements of each definition will be combined in the analytical framework proposed in Part III.
A. The Contemporary Navigability-in-Fact Standard
The narrower of the two rules defining navigability for admiralty purposes requires that the waters in question actually support commercial shipping, or have a "present capacity to sustain commercial shipping." 104 Read closely, this rule has a "hard" and a "soft" version. Finneseth v. Carter, 712 F.2d 1041 , 1045 -46 (6th Cir. 1983 ). 107. 528 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1975 . In a subsequent case, however, the Ninth Circuit characterized its Adams holding in a way that appears to endorse the hard version of the rule. "Because we concluded that none of the activities on the river constituted commerce, we held the action was not cognizable in admiralty." In re Paradise Holdings, Inc., 795 F.2d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1986 795 F.2d 756, 759 (9th Cir. ), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1008 795 F.2d 756, 759 (9th Cir. (1986 Kankakee River in Illinois. 112 In both cases, and in several others applying the contemporary navigability-in-fact standard, the watenvay either previously had supported, or was physically capable of supporting, commercial activity. 11 3 The strongest argument supporting the contemporary navigabilityin-fact standard is that, because admiralty exists only to serve the national interest in commercial shipping, there is no federal interest to protect if there is no shipping. 114 This argument relies heavily on Kaiser Aetna's admonition that definitions of navigability should reflect the purpose they serve. 115 It is a strong policy argument but requires a carefully made distinction between the federal interest in maintaining admiralty jurisdiction over navigable waters from the "intense" federal interest in uniform regulations governing safety, navigation, and other concerns regulated under the Commerce Clause. 116 An important corollary to the argument that admiralty jurisdiction
should not exist in the absence of commerce derives from The Genesee Chief precedent that as maritime commerce expands, admiralty juris- Although past activities and conditions of Clear Lake indicate the presence of previous interstate commerce, the activities and condition of Clear Lake now and at the time of the subject accident are and were non-commercial and intrastate. In addition, the condition and location of the lake do not make it susceptible to interstate commerce in the future. 114. The Ninth Circuit wrote: The logic of requiring commercial activity is evident. The purpose behind the grant of admiralty jurisdiction is the protection and promotion of the maritime shipping industry through the development and application, by neutral federal courts, of a uniform and specialized body of federal law .... In the absence of commercial activity, present or potential, there is no federal interest justifying the frustration of legitimate state interests. The foregoing reveals two strong arguments for restricting admiralty jurisdiction to waters that presently support or are likely to support commercial navigation: the generally assumed, albeit historically uncertain, 128 reasoning that admiralty exists only to further the federal interest in creating a uniform body oflaw for maritime commerce; and the argument that admiralty jurisdiction should not anachronistically remain after a waterway falls out of commercial use. Other arguments for the contemporary navigability-in-fact standard -based on a suspect reading of precedent or a desire to limit the federal caseload by excluding cases involving pleasure boats -are misplaced.
B. The Navigational Capacity Standard
The navigational capacity standard does not require actual or probable commerce. It asks only whether a waterway is "susceptible or capable of being used as an interstate highway of commerce." 129 "Susceptible or capable" in this context means physically capable. 130 descend. The contrivance is of such a nature that it works only in one way -moves the weight only in one direction.
Id. at 913. "It was said of the late Justice Story, that if a bucket of water were brought into his court with a com cob floating in it, he would at once extend the admiralty jurisdiction of the The strongest argument advanced in favor of the navigational capacity standard, and against the contemporary navigability-in-fact standard, is that a definition based on the presence or absence of commercial activity is unstable. 134 As the Finneseth court observed, if current or present commercial maritime activity is th.e test, a ferry could operate on Dale Hollow Lake between Kentucky and Tennessee one day and go out of business the next and tortious occurrences happening on each of the two days would be subject to different rules of conduct and liability.135 This instability causes significant problems for courts applying the contemporary navigability-in-fact standard. As a result, decisions have turned on such trivial facts as whether or not the post office used a boat to deliver the maiJ. 136 A definition of navigability based on the amount of commerce also leads to problems in dividing a waterway into navigable and nonnavigable sections. 13 7 This problem is easily surmounted in cases like [Vol. 90:1028 Adams, which arise on artificial lakes closed by dams, 138 but not for those arising on inland rivers and lakes with potentially navigable outlets and tributaries.
Proponents of the navigational capacity standard maintain that The Daniel Ball and The Montello definitions speak in terms of navigational capacity and should be construed broadly.139
No Supreme court case imposes the requirement that navigability only exists, for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction, if the lake or river is currently or presently being used as a highway for interstate commerce. This requirement has been imposed, however, by the Eighth Circuit [in Livingston], despite the contrary language of futurity, such as "susceptibility," "capability," and "may be" conducted or carried on, in early Supreme Court cases. 140 The context of the early cases supports this argument. Throughout the nineteenth century the Court pursued a vigorous policy of expanding admiralty jurisdiction to places where commerce might follow. 141
Several courts adopting the navigational capacity standard have also argued that the federal interest in protecting maritime commerce is best served by uniform administration of activities on potentially navigable waters. Although the primary focus of admiralty jurisdiction is unquestionably the protection of maritime commerce, petitioners take too narrow a view of the federal interest sought to be protected. The federal interest in protecting maritime commerce cannot be adequately served if admiralty jurisdiction is restricted to those individuals actually engaged in maritime activity. This interest can be fully vindicated only if all operators of vessels on navigable waters are subject to uniform rules of conduct. The failure to recognize the breadth of this federal interest ignores the potential effect of noncommercial maritime activity on maritime commerce. 457 U.S. 668, 674 (1982) .
See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
A final argument ·advanced in favor of the navigational capacity standard is that it provides easy access to the federal courts. In contrast to courts that use definitions of navigability to restrict jurisdiction, the Richardson court viewed its role more expansively: "Jurisdiction should be as readily ascertainable as courts can make it. If the waterway is capable of being used in commerce, that is a sufficient threshold to invoke admiralty jurisdiction." 145 The different philosophies of the Richardson and Adams courts represent an unresolvable difference of opinion about the role of the federal courts. 146 The jurisdictional rule chosen, however, can have serious consequences. A plaintiff whose case is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction based solely on the definition of navigable waters may be denied access to any forum, and therefore denied any remedy. 147
In summary, there are sound arguments for the navigational capacity standard based on its certainty, uniformity, and consistency with precedent. Weaker arguments stem from a desire for comprehensive regulation of all maritime activities and a desire to provide easy access to the federal courts.
C. Is an Interstate Nexus Required?
The Finneseth court interpreted Supreme Court precedent as requiring admiralty jurisdiction over waters that form an interstate nexus. 148 This section considers whether admiralty jurisdiction can be determined by geography alone. Three types of waterways are discussed: those connecting two or more states, those located in a single state but that combine with others to connect two or more states, and those landlocked entirely within a single state.
'Ihere is little dispute that lakes or rivers that lie on the border between two states, large rivers that flow through two or more states, and rivers that empty into the sea are navigable for admiralty purposes.149 This is true whether or not there is evidence of commerce on determinations that interstate bodies of water are navigable seem to rest simply on the observation that they are capable of serving as highways for interstate commerce. 153
The same reasoning holds true for waterways that connect with others to form a continuous interstate highway. Most courts have defined such waters as navigable. 154 The Livingston decision is a prominent exception. 155 The case concerned an accident on the Norfolk River in Arkansas, which eventually flows into the Mississippi below the site of the accident. 156 The court's reasoning turned on the fact that the accident occurred near the Norfolk hydroelectric dam that had eliminated waterborne commerce in the area, 157 but it ignored the fact that the accident occurred below the dam. Because the accident situs was on a continuous interstate waterway, the Livingston decision was criticized by the Finneseth court for discounting the importance of the interstate nexus.1ss
Waters confined to a single state present more difficult problems. 159 Two types of waterways must be distinguished: those that are naturally landlocked, and those, like the lake in Adams, that were once connected with other waters but have become landlocked by lockless dams. In the few cases in the first category, all but one of the naturally landlocked lakes in a single state were held to be nonnavigable.160 Interestingly, however, none of these cases was decided solely on the lack of an interstate nexus. In each case the court based its ruling, at least in part, on a finding that the lake did not support commerce. If the interstate nexus requirement is deemed dispositive, such an analysis would be unnecessary.
A more frequent situation is the case of dams built across previously navigable rivers. Most courts faced with the issue have followed the Adams reasoning 161 and held that when a waterway loses the capacity to support commercial traffic it ceases to be navigable for admiralty purposes. 1 6 2 The two cases holding otherwise appear to have been overruled.163
Decisions such as Adams, however, do present doctrinal difficulties. Because The Daniel Ball and The Montello refer to a waterway's navigability in its "natural state," some courts have suggested that the navigability of a dam-made lake should tum on the navigability of the underlying river. 164 This rationale has played an important role in Commerce Clause and property cases. 165 Similarly, -the Appalachian totally within the boundaries of the State ofldaho and by the use of the waters of the lake it is not possible to reach ports of call other than in the State of Idaho without removing the vessel or boat onto land and transporting it to another body of water. 425 F. Supp. at 117-18. The judge held the lake to be navigable for admiralty purposes based on a Coast Guard determination that the lake was navigable. 425 F. Supp. at 118. Such a basis for a determination of navigability is unjustified as the determinations of administrative officers are not controlling. See supra note 100. Rowley should be dismissed as a poorly reasoned anomaly.
161. Adams v. Montana Power Co., 528 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1975 1926) , title to land which had been underwater but was uncovered at the time of the case depended on whether the lake [Vol. 90:1028 Electric doctrine of immutable navigability, which has been used extensively in admiralty cases, 166 suggests that damming a river should not necessarily remove it from admiralty jurisdiction. To dismiss these arguments, courts have relied heavily on the distinction between admiralty and other types of cases involving navigable waters. 167 Declaring that intrastate lakes large enough to support substantial commerce are nonnavigable for admiralty purposes is more difficult. For example, the Lake of the Ozarks in Missouri, which has been the site of several accidents giving rise to admiralty claims, 168 supports some commercial shipping and transportation. 169 In denying admiralty jurisdiction to cases arising on the lake, the Eighth Circuit drew a bright line between intra-and interstate commerce in the physical sense. 170 Thus, for admiralty purposes, interstate commerce occurs only when a vessel actually moves between two states. This reasoning seems contrary to The Montello, which established the principle that vessels on intrastate voyages were subject to admiralty jurisdiction if they carried goods moving in interstate commerce. 171 The two cases may be reconciled, however, by reading The Montello and other early cases as basing admiralty jurisdiction on the interstate character of the waterway, not on the status of the vessel. 172 The Eighth Circuit has recognized this, 17 3 and its definition of navigability seems to have returned full circle to that first laid down in The Daniel Ball: whether the waterway is physically capable of serving as a highway for interstate transportation and commerce.
Based on the above analysis, almost all the cases concerning inland waters can be reconciled under the principle that admiralty jurisdic-tion only extends over waterways physically capable of carrying vessels engaged in commerce between the states. Interstate bodies of water clearly qualify, as do those that connect with interstate waterways. Conversely, waters landlocked in a single state, whether naturally so or because of dams, are not navigable for admiralty purposes.
The foregoing review of conflicting standards of navigability reveals three strong principles that are combined in a comprehensive system in Part III. First, the doctrine of immutable navigability should not apply in admiralty. When a waterway loses its capacity to support interstate commerce, it should cease to be subject to federal jurisdiction. Second, determination of navigability should tum on the characteristics of the waterway itself, not on the presence or absence of commerce. Such a requirement is inherently unstable. Third, to be considered navigable, a waterway must be part of an interstate nexus.
III. PROPOSED ANALYTICAL SCHEME FOR DEFINING NAVIGABLE WATERS
In Part II, this Note described considerable disagreement among courts attempting to define navigable waters, but suggested that synthesis is possible. Resolving the conflict requires addressing three issues. First, any definition must clearly address a federal interest. Second, a framework for applying aging Supreme Court precedents to modem situations must be developed. Third, substantive differences about the role of interstate commerce in the definition of navigability must be resolved.
This Part proposes an analytical scheme for determining navigability in particular cases. It draws from all the competing definitions described in Part II to provide a workable system that incorporates the major goals of each. Section III.A describes the policies and interests the system is designed to advance. The system itself is defined and defended in section 111.B. The important Supreme Court precedents are integrated at each step of the analysis.
A. The Federal Admiralty Interest and Navigable Waters
The primary federal interest served by admiralty courts is the provision of a specialized forum to administer a unique system of law that serves the special needs of the shipping industry. 174 The federal interest, however, is not exclusively defined by the shipping industry. Rather, an independent federal interest exists in maintaining jurisdiction over the waters that form the highways capable of carrying interstate commerce. 175 [A] n enormous amount of expensive legal ability will be used up on jurisdictional issues when it could be much better spent upon elucidating the merits of cases. In short, a trial judge ought to be able to tell easily and fast what belongs in his court and what has no business there." 176 Justice Scalia's criticisms apply equally well to definitions of navigability based on such tenuous findings as whether a ferry was operating on the day of an accident.17 7 Judicial inquiry will always be necessary when the navigability of a particular waterway is challenged, but the scheme proposed below should make the defining process more efficient and accurate.
B. Defining Navigable Waters
The conflict among competing definitions of navigability stems primarily from two misunderstandings about the role of interstate commerce in that definition. First, courts have focused on the inter-or intrastate nature of the commerce, not of the waterway itself. 178 Second, some courts have transformed the general federal interest into a requirement that commerce actually or potentially exist. 17 9 The proposed scheme redirects attention to the physical characteristics of the waterway in question. Analysis of the type, amount, or likelihood of commerce is discarded in favor of a simpler inquiry into whether interstate transportation is possible on a particular body of water.
Determining whether a body of water is navigable for admiralty purposes rests on five basic principles: The sections that follow discuss each of these principles in detail.
176. Sisson v. Ruby, 110 S. Ct. 2892 , 2902 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 312 (1950)).
177.
See supra text accompanying note 135; Finneseth v. Carter, 712 F.2d 1041 , 1046 -47 (6th Cir. 1983 ).
178. See supra section 11.C. 179. See supra section II.A.
Interstate Nexus Required
Both Supreme Court precedent and the interests those decisions attempted to protect suggest that navigable waters. must be part of an interstate nexus. 180 The most direct suggestion is. The Daniel Ball's explicit distinction between the "navigable waters of the United States," and the "navigable waters of the States." 181 The navigable waters of the United States form part of "a continued highway over which commerce is or may be carried on with other States or foreign countries." 182 Even more explicit is the definition of navigable waters in Ex parte Boyer: "a highway for commerce between ports and places in different States."1s 3 The fundamental concern underlying these definitions is that admiralty jurisdiction should tum on the interstate nature of the water, not the type of activity occurring there.1 84
Requiring an interstate nexus eliminates from admiralty jurisdiction all accidents occurring on waters landlocked within a single state, regardless of their capacity to support commerce. Excluding those intrastate bodies of water that are large enough to support commercial activity such as the Lake of the Ozarks 185 is at first troubling. It could be argued that if the primary interest of admiralty jurisdiction is to serve the needs of the commercial shipping industry, that interest should encompass all shipping, wherever it occurs. Commercial shipping, however, as used to define admiralty jurisdiction, has a very specific meaning. The federal interest in interstate waters depends on the federal interest in the actual interstate movement of goods by water, a different idea than the modem notion of interstate commerce. 186 Furthermore, such cases are rare and the utility of a clearly applicable rule outweighs potential objections in unusual instances. 187
Only waters capable of supporting uninterrupted interstate travel should be considered navigable. The Montello's rule that waters may still be defined as navigable despite occasional obstacles should be discarded.188 The rule is outdated and at odds with the principle that 187. Again, Justice Scalia's criticism of the nexus test provides a useful analogy. The time expended on such rare freakish cases will be saved many times over by a clear jurisdictional rule that makes it unnecessary to decide, in hundreds of other cases, what particular activities aboard a vessel are "traditionally maritime" in nature and what effect a particular tort will have on maritime commerce. Sisson v. Ruby, 110 S. Ct. 2892 Ct. , 2902 Ct. (1990 (Scalia, J., concurring 
Immutable Navigability Does Not Apply
The doctrine of immutable navigability was developed to justify expansive federal regulation under the Commerce Clause. 190 The rule is also essential in property law to assure stable title. 191 Immutable navigability, however, is inappropriate in admiralty. When the physical characteristics of a waterway change to make it incapable of serving as a highway between the states, the waterway should drop out of admiralty jurisdiction.192
The requirement that a waterway's navigability should be determined from its "natural state," first announced in The Montello, 1 93 should also be discarded. The Supreme Court itself has held that formerly nonnavigable waters may become navigable for admiralty purposes through "improvements." 194 The converse should also be true. Admiralty jurisdiction should not include waterways that have been modified and are no longer navigable. Determinations that watenvays are no longer navigable, however, should be made cautiously and should only be based on substantial physical changes. Most obviously, building a lockless dam to create an intrastate lake with no navigable outlets would qualify as a substantial change. 1 9 5 The doctrine of immutable navigability should also not apply when a waterway undergoes a substantial natural change. Cutting off an oxbow from a major river would constitute a substantial change. A temporary reduction in a river's flow due to a period of drought, however, would not qualify. Similarly, a seasonal reduction in flow should Rejecting the doctrine of immutable navigability also protects the expectations of the parties. People base their decisions and actions on contemporary circumstances. It makes little sense to rest a jurisdictional ruling, which may have a significant impact on liability, 198 on an outdated set of facts and circumstances. 19 9 Courts should be free to reexamine the navigability of a waterway whenever circumstances warrant. 200 In every individual case a federal court must examine its jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter anew. 201 Jurisdiction over a particular place should be similarly reviewed.
Waters Currently Used for Commerce Are Considered Navigable
An interstate nexus is necessary but not sufficient for a waterway to be navigable. The caveat quoted in The Montello has as much force today as it did in 1874. 202 Not every creek or pond that happens to fall on a border and is capable of floating a canoe should be navigable for admiralty purposes. The task should be identifying those interstate waters that should be considered navigable.
196. See Sanders v. Placid Oil Co., 861 F.2d 1374 , 1376 -77 (5th Cir. 1988 ) (lake still navigable for admiralty jurisdiction despite being passable only certain parts of the year). Although developed in a different context, reasoning from Appalachian Elec. is persuasive. " [It is not] necessary for navigability that the use of a river should be continuous. The character of the region, its products and the difficulties or dangers of the navigation influence the regularity and extent of the use." United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co. 311 U.S. 377, 409 (1940) .
197. The portion of the Adams reasoning that turns on present use is rejected because of its uncertainty and instability. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text. The reasoning that turns on "potential" use is adopted, but only insofar as it applies to the physical characteristics of the waterway. , a district court complained that it was compelled to assert jurisdiction by a prior decision declaring the lake in question navigable. After the Eighth Circuit decided Livingston v. United States, 627 F.2d 165 (8th Cir. 1980) , which rejected the doctrine of immutable navigability, the district court unhesitatingly reversed its order, declared the lake nonnavigable, declined jurisdiction, and dismissed the suit. Cooper v. United States, 500 F. Supp. 191 (W.D. Mo. 1980 ). 201. See, e.g., Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280 , 1282 (7th Cir. 1986 ); FED. R. Crv. P. 12(h)(3).
202. It is not every ditch, in which the salt water ebbs and flows, through the extensive salt marshes along the coast, and which serve to admit and drain off the salt water from the marshes, which can be considered a navigable stream. Nor is it every small creek, in which a fishing skiff or gunning canoe can be made to float, at high water which is deemed navigable.
[Vol. 90:1028 A waterway should be defined as navigable based on its physical capacity to support interstate commerce. Unfortunately, a definition based only on physical features such as the depth of a lake or the width of a river is inadequate. Such a rule would be both arbitrary and based on an assumption about how large a waterway must be to be capable of supporting commercial navigation. Thus, it is impossible to determine a waterway's navigational capacity without considering the types of activities it actually supports. Evidence of use or nonuse should be used to make a broader finding about a waterway's physical capacity to support commercial navigation. Evidence of current use is evidence of that capacity. Therefore, waterways currently used for commerce are conclusively presumed to be navigable.
Waters Formerly Used for Commerce Are Presumed Navigable
Waters that once supported commercial traffic are presumed to be navigable because that use is evidence of their navigational capacity. This presumption of navigability is, however, subject to two conditions. First, the waterway must not have undergone a significant physical change since the cessation of commercial activity that would prevent the resumption of such activity. Second, the past type of commercial activity must be reasonably likely to resume in the foreseeable future. It is a technical inquiry. On the one hand, a waterway should not be perpetually navigable because fur trappers once paddled there; 203 but, on the other, a river should not cease to be navigable just because the ferry goes out of business. 2 04 At first, such a technical rule seems at odds with the admonition in The Montello that navigability should not be determined by the type or method of commercial activity. 205 The Montello, however, should be read as expressing incomplete Supreme Court doctrine on the question of navigability. In deciding The Montello, the Court was faced with its then very recent precedent of The Daniel Ball, which required that navigability be assessed from a waterway's ordinary condition. 20 6 It was also faced with a factual situation seemingly at odds with this requirement. The Fox River could not, in its natural state, have supported the steamboat that was the subject of the action. 207 Thus, the 203. See e.g., The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430 (1874) . Similarly the kind of evidence used to support a finding of navigability for title purposes in Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9
Court confronted a conflict between the expressed rule and the policy behind it. Instead of extending the definition of navigability to include "improved" waterways as it did in later decisions,2°8 the Court chose a more conservative course. It used evidence of prior use to support a finding that the river was navigable in its natural state. 209 The expansion of the definition of navigable waters in subsequent cases makes such an analysis unnecessary today. Now only inquiry into whether the waterway, in its current state, is capable of supporting commerce in the "customary modes in which such commerce is conducted by water" 210 is necessary.
Judge Stagg's reasoning in Smith v. Hustler, Inc., 211 is an example of how to apply The Daniel Ball's requirements in a modern setting.
It is common knowledge that since the dam was constructed at Lake Bistineau the lake has not been susceptible of use for commercial shipping and, in fact, has been used exclusively for recreational activities. One simply would not expect to see, and would not see, tugboats, barges, or any other type of commercial vessel on Lake Bistineau. 21 2 For large interstate lakes, such as the one in Finneseth, applying such reasoning will be difficult. 213 If the Smith reasoning turns on a finding of probability, then it is error. But if the passage reflects a determination about the physical characteristics of the lake itself, then it is an excellent model. 214 In borderline cases, it seems appropriate to err on the side of navigability. Deciding conclusively that a previously navigable waterway is no longer capable of supporting commercial traffic seems to require greater certainty than conceding that it could be used again. " Finneseth v. Carter, 712 F.2d 1041 , 1044 (6th Cir. 1983 . If, as argued here, The Montello's "liberal" rule does not necessarily control, see supra text accompanying notes 205-10, the inquiry should extend only to the common types of contemporary commercial vessels.
214. It is, however, troubling that Lake Bistineau is "30 or 40 miles long, [and] from 1 to 2 miles wide." Smith v. Hustler, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 1265 , 1267 (W.D. La. 1981 ) (quoting Sapp v. Frazier, 26 So. 378, 379 (La. 1899 ). Because of its large size it seems at least possible that the lake may be capable of supporting some type of commercial activity.
215. In specific cases like Finneseth, a finding of navigability serves another judicial interest. In Finneseth it was uncertain whether the accident occurred in Kentucky or Tennessee. 712 F.2d at 1042. Thus the choice of laws problem was not simply between state and federal law but between three possible alternatives. In such cases a choice of federal law seems a safe middle course.
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Waters Never Used for Commerce Are Presumed Nonnavigable
Waters that have never been used for commercial transportation should be presumed to be nonnavigable for admiralty purposes. Extensive and regular use by recreational boaters, however, may demonstrate the waterway's physical capacity to support commerce. A finding that such a waterway is navigable should be made even more cautiously than a determination that a formerly navigable watenvay no longer is. The federal interest in exerting jurisdiction over historically unused bodies of water is minimal.
In the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court expanded the waters subject to admiralty jurisdiction in response to a dramatic increase in commercial activity. 216 Similar considerations should still apply. In contrast to situations discussed above, here a consideration of the likelihood of commercial activity is relevant to whether a particular waterway should be considered navigable. An inquiry into whether waters historically not used for commerce are navigable for admiralty purposes should proceed in two steps.
Initially, the nature and extent of currently ongoing waterborne activity should be evaluated to determine whether a waterway is physically capable of supporting contemporary commerce. If not, the waterway is not navigable for admiralty purposes. If the watenvay is physically capable then inquiry should be made into whether commercial use is foreseeable.
Most important in the foreseeability inquiry is the level of commercial activity on nearby or connected bodies of water. If such activity is common, and is likely to expand into the waterway in question, then a finding of navigability for admiralty purposes is justifiable. If there is no waterborne commercial activity nearby then a finding of navigability is probably unwarranted. Considering the level of commercial activity for this limited category of waterways protects the federal interest in highways of waterborne commerce when appropriate but does not impose it unnecessarily. When circumstances change sufficiently to warrant a new finding of navigability then such determinations should be possible.
The principles developed in this Part describe a workable system of determining when waters are navigable for admiralty purposes. As a threshold matter such waters must be part of an interstate nexus forming a continuous highway for waterborne commerce between the states. Determinations of navigability should be based on the physical characteristics of the waterway. Evidence of use or nonuse should be used to determine a waterway's capacity to support commercial transportation. The likelihood of such use is only germane when consider-ing whether to define as navigable waters which have not previously been used for commerce.
The system described has several advantages. It establishes clear jurisdictional rules which will quickly resolve most questions of navigability. It establishes an analytical framework for evaluating evidence pertaining to navigability in the few borderline cases that will arise. Because it emphasizes the physical characteristics of the waterway, rather than the activities occurring there, the system is stable and predictable. Finally, the scheme avoids treating particular types of activity, like recreational boating, as relevant to the definition of navigability, focusing attention on the nexus test to determine whether particular cases should be subject to admiralty jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
Defining precisely which waters should be considered navigable for admiralty purposes has proven difficult for several reasons. Although the concept of navigability plays an important role in several contexts unrelated to admiralty, the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue for nearly a century, and the controlling precedents are outdated. Consequently, lower courts have split over the proper definition of navigability to apply in a modem context. The principal competing theories are the contemporary navigability in fact standard, which requires evidence of actual or probable commercial activity, and the navigational capacity standard, which requires only that a waterway be physically capable of supporting interstate commerce.
This Note resolves the conflict by proposing a simple set of presumptive rules for determining the navigability of a particular waterway. For admiralty purposes the navigable waters of the United States are those that form part of an interstate nexus and that are physically capable of supporting commercial traffic. Elements of both the contemporary navigability in fact standard and the navigational capacity standard are combined to produce a system that reflects the major goals and concerns of each. The resulting system is constitutionally sound, faithful to precedent, fulfills the goals of admiralty, and most importantly, is straightforward, predictable, and easy to apply.
